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We analyze contractual clauses which limit the ability of licensees to
challenge patents at the basis of their licensing agreements. In particular, we
study no-contest clauses, which prohibit licensees from contesting the validity
of the patent, and challenge-penalty clauses, which penalize licensees for doing
so. We develop a model that we use to compare three legal regimes: "No
Restriction, " in which the patent holder is given complete contractual freedom,
"Partial Restriction, " in which no-contest clauses are forbidden but challenge
penalties are allowed, and "Total Restriction," in which neither no-contest nor
challenge penalty clauses are enforced. We show that No Restriction is unlikely
to be optimal, and further, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions
under which Total Restriction is optimal. The rule we suggest differs
significantly from the one currently applied by most courts.
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Introduction
A firm is awarded a patent for a new technology, and it licenses the patent
to a manufacturer. The licensing agreement contains a clause explicitly
forbidding the manufacturer from challenging the validity of the patent. Later,
once new information regarding the patent's validity is revealed, the
manufacturer nonetheless brings a suit challenging the validity of the patent.
Should the challenge be allowed?
Alternatively, suppose that the licensing agreement contains a different
clause, requiring the manufacturer to pay a penalty if it chooses to bring a
challenge. Should the court require the manufacturer to pay the penalty if a
challenge is brought?
In the middle of the twentieth century, these questions would not have
arisen. In that era, courts employed the principle of contractual estoppel to
prohibit the licensee from challenging the validity of the patent even if the
contract contained no limitation to that effect. However, the Supreme Court
has since abandoned this doctrine, recognizing that invalid patents impose a
large social cost. It is now settled that a licensee may challenge a patent when
the contract is silent on this matter.
What is not settled, however, is whether a licensee may challenge a patent
when the contract explicitly forbids him from doing so. While the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on this issue, lower courts have provided mixed
decisions. Some courts have found no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses to
be unenforceable based on the public interest in ridding the economy of invalid
patents. Others have chosen to enforce them, at least under some
circumstances, favoring contractual certainty and risk sharing between the
parties. These clashing decisions make it likely that the Supreme Court will
consider the validity and effect of these types of clauses in the future. We
provide a framework within which no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses
may be analyzed.
Patents play a central role in our modern knowledge-based economy. The
patent holder reveals novel and non-obvious knowledge that will become
public property at the end of the patent term.' In exchange, he is granted the
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exclusive use of the patent for its duration. This exclusivity allows the inventor
to capture a significant portion of the value of the patent, and thereby increases
incentives for innovation. At the same time, this exclusivity entails costs.
Patents can cause all of the social harms that are normally understood to stem
from monopolies-namely, underproduction of the patented good, high prices,
and waste in the production process.2 Furthermore, they create several patent-
specific social costs. Production of multi-patent products might be limited by
the anticommons problem,3 and future follow-on inventions may also be
limited for similar reasons. To prevent this waste, it is important to ensure that
patents are only granted when the patent holder has performed his part of the
bargain.'
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has the primary responsibility for
determining whether an invention qualifies for a patent. Evaluating a patent is
costly: it takes time, effort, and skill; and the PTO sometimes makes mistakes,
such as granting a patent application when the invention is obvious or
preempted. The number of mistakes is thought to have increased in recent
years, as the resources allocated to examining patents have not kept pace with
the substantial growth in the number and complexity of patent applications.7
Accordingly, the responsibility for eliminating unwarranted patents that
impose significant social costs was partially transferred to the market. The law
provides patents with a rebuttable presumption of validity that may be
challenged by private parties.8 The Supreme Court has recognized that private
patent challenges advance two public interests: "the important public interest in
permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas that are in reality part of
University of Haifa. The authors would also like to thank the editors of the Yale Journal on Regulation
for superb comments. Any mistakes or omissions are the authors'.
1. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 154 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97
HARV. L. REv. 1813 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998).
4. For the purposes of this Article, we assume that patent law creates an efficient
social contract. For a contrary view, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
6. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2004).
7. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 9-10 (2003). For an argument that his allocation of
resources is efficient, see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495 (2001).
8. Under patent law, anyone can challenge the validity of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 302
(2012). The Supreme Court has recognized as early as 1875 that a patent is a "prima facie right only ...
subject to an examination by the courts." Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 355 (1875). The Federal
Circuit has also adopted this view. See, e.g., In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856-57 (Fed. Cit. 1985).
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the public domain,"9 and the public interest in preventing monopolies based on
invalid patents.10
Patent licensees are in a special position to perform this role. Their
practical experience with the subject matter of the patent often places them in a
good position to evaluate the novelty of the invention.1 They might also have
an incentive to challenge the patent to avoid paying royalties to the patent
holder.12 In fact, as the Supreme Court stated in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
"[1]icensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive
to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery."13
This is where no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses enter the picture.
A licensee in a weak bargaining position might have little choice but to agree to
a no-contest clause, forbidding him from challenging the patent, or a challenge-
penalty clause, which penalizes him for doing so. A licensee with more
bargaining power might also agree to such clauses in exchange for better
contractual terms. These clauses lead to an increase in the expected joint profits
of the licensee and the patent holder, who can then share the surplus. The
public at large, however, loses from this arrangement.
Despite the impact of these contractual clauses, their enforceability has
not yet received an in-depth analysis. Rather, most court decisions use general
language, emphasizing one consideration over another, without providing the
nuanced analysis that is required to ensure that the rule adopted actually
furthers collective welfare. Academic scholarship on this question is relatively
sparse and does not provide a clear answer.
This Article attempts to fill this void. We analyze the effects of no-contest
and challenge-penalty clauses and consider whether or not enforcing these
clauses maximizes social welfare. Making this determination is of high
importance because these contractual limitations, which can significantly affect
the motivation and ability of a licensee to challenge an invalid patent, are
boilerplate provisions in many patent-licensing agreements. Patent licenses are
an important and common means toward efficient dissemination of new
products and technologies in the marketplace.
9. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
10. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalue Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945)
(protecting the competitive economy by keeping open the way for interested persons to challenge the
validity of patents which might be shown to be invalid); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320
U.S. 661, 665 (1944) ("It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system."); Pope Mfg. Co.
v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 235 (1892) ("'[T]he right to make the defense is not only a private right to
the individual, but it is founded on public policy, which is promoted by his making the defense, and
contravened by his refusal to make it."' (quoting Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503, 532 (1860))).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. The contract might be based on multiple patents. This fact does not change the
analysis significantly. For simplicity reasons, we assume throughout this article that one patent serves as
the basis of each licensing contract.




In particular, this Article compares the welfare effects of three potential
legal rules. These rules can be thought of as points along a spectrum. At one
end is a rule of per se invalidity, which prohibits both no-contest and challenge-
penalty clauses. We call this rule "Total Restriction." At the other end is a rule
that prohibits neither type of clause. We call this rule "No Restriction." In the
middle of the spectrum is "Partial Restriction," a rule that prohibits no-contest
clauses but allows certain types of challenge-penalty clauses.
We provide conditions under which each rule is superior to the others.
Our conclusions have important implications for public policy. In general,
"Total Restriction," the rule of per se invalidity, will ensure that social welfare
is maximized. This rule is very different from the one currently applied in the
Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases.
In some cases, however, it may make sense for courts to allow a very limited
set of challenge-penalty clauses. The "No Restriction" rule will generally be
inefficient, but could be optimal under certain circumstances.
The roadmap of this Article is as follows. Part I describes and analyzes the
different rules that courts have applied to no-contest and challenge-penalty
clauses. Part II provides an analysis of the competing interests. Part III offers a
systematic analysis of the potential "Total Restriction," "No Restriction," and
"Partial Restriction" legal rules. This analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we
develop an economic model to analyze the effects of the three proposed legal
rules on parties' conduct. Second, the three legal regimes are compared in
terms of social welfare. We conclude by presenting the optimal set of legal
rules for contractual limitations on licensees' ability to challenge patents.
I. Current Legal Rules
The legal doctrines governing the right of a licensee to challenge a patent
have changed significantly over the past century. This Part analyzes the
evolution and the current state of the law, emphasizing the different
considerations to which courts have given primacy over time.
A. Licensee Estoppel and Actual Controversy Limitations
The doctrine of licensee estoppel, first established by the Supreme Court
in 1855,14 held that a licensee is barred from challenging the validity of a
patent.15 This doctrine. was predicated on the view that a licensee's acceptance
of a licensing agreement constituted implicit recognition of the patent's
validity, regardless of whether the patent contained an explicit no-contest
14. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855); see also United States v.
Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905).
15. Kinsman, 59 U.S. at 289.
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clause. Equitable considerations were given decisive weight; public policy
goals of invalidating unwarranted patents were largely ignored.
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court narrowed the doctrine of licensee
estoppel in a series of decisions ruling that a licensee may challenge a patent
when the patent monopoly is used to justify an otherwise impermissible
agreement to fix prices." The Court regarded such a challenge as a service in
the public interest.17 The Court, however, was careful not to abandon the entire
doctrine, and held in Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine that the
general rule of licensee estoppel applied outside the specific context of price
fixing.18 Then in 1969, in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the Court revisited the question
of licensee estoppel and unanimously chose to repudiate the doctrine.'9 Lear
forms the bedrock of contemporary law on licensee estoppel.
Lear, an aerospace manufacturer, hired Mr. Adkins to develop a more
efficient gyroscope. They entered into an agreement under which Lear would
license and pay royalties for any discovery made by Adkins. Lear began
producing a large number of gyroscopes based on one such discovery, which
Adkins later attempted to patent. After several years and many rejected patent
applications, Lear stopped paying royalties, claiming that the invention was
anticipated by prior art. As soon as Adkins obtained a patent, he sued Lear.
Though Lear attempted to raise the defense of patent invalidity, the lower
courts applied the doctrine of licensee estoppel, barring the defense and
directing a verdict for Adkins. The Supreme Court reversed, and in doing so
overruled the line of cases, such as Automatic Radio, which had held that
licensee estoppel was the "general rule."20 Rather, the Court gave decisive
weight to the "important public interest in permitting full and free competition
in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain."2' The Court
emphasized the importance of enabling licensees in particular to challenge the
validity of patents, since "[1]icensees may often be the only individuals with
enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's
discovery."22 Accordingly, the decision was based on an assumption that
allowing patent challenges furthers social welfare.
In 2007, the Court further expanded licensees' rights to challenge patent
validity in Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.23 Until then, courts had thrown
16. MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947); Edward
Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalue Mfg.
Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). This exception to
the general rule of licensee estoppel was also independent of whether the contract contained an explicit
clause prohibiting challenges.
17. Edward Katzinger Co., 329 U.S. at 401.
18. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
19. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
20. Id. at 671.
21. Id. at 670.
22. Id.




out licensee invalidity suits absent a threat of an imminent infringement suit
(the "actual controversy" requirement). Previously, for example, in Gen-Probe,
Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., a 2004 case, the licensee challenged the validity of the patent
while continuing to pay royalties. The Federal Circuit dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.24 The court found the case nonjusticiable for
lack of "actual controversy" because the licensee could not have had "a
reasonable apprehension of [an infringement] lawsuit" at the time the action
was initiated.25 Under Gen-Probe, a licensee faced two options: (1) continue to
operate based on the contract and not challenge validity; or (2) terminate its
license and challenge validity. The latter option entailed significant risk. If the
licensee continued to use the patent, an unsuccessful challenge would
consequently require the licensee to shut down its operations and pay damages
for patent infringement. While the licensee could avoid this risk by ceasing
production for the period of the lawsuit, to do so would be costly for both the
licensee and society at large, which could no longer benefit from the licensee's
product.
But in Medlmmune, the Supreme Court opened a third option for the
licensee.26 Rejecting the holding of Gen-Probe, the Court held that the Federal
Circuit has subject matter jurisdiction to hear a patent challenge brought by a
licensee performing contractual duties under protest. The Court's rationale was
that "[p]romising to pay royalties on patents that have not been held invalid
does not amount to a promise not to seek a holding of their invalidity."27 In
effect, the Court increased the patent holder's risk that his patent would be
found invalid. Importantly, however, the Court emphasized the absence of any
provision in the contract that could fairly be construed as prohibiting a
challenge to the licensed patents.28
B. Explicit No-Contest Clauses
While Lear repudiated the doctrine of licensee estoppel, controversy has
arisen over how far its reasoning reaches. One important question involves the
enforceability of explicit no-contest clauses. This question arose especially in
the context of settlement agreements, which involve an economically
significant class of cases since many patent licenses are signed after the patent
holder initially brings an infringement claim.29 Different courts have adopted
24. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
25. Id. at 1381.
26. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. 118.
27. Id. at 135.
28. Id.; see also SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (extending the right to request declaratory judgments to include situations in which a patentee
asserts rights under a patent even if he promises not o sue).
29. See, e.g., Rates Tech., Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2012)
("As the present case demonstrates, it is common for patent licensing agreements to be entered into after
a patent owner makes an initial accusation of infringement.").
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different rules.3 0 Of these courts, the Federal Circuit is the most important since
it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.
In Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., a licensee who had previously challenged
the patent-after being accused of infringement-settled the challenge with a
licensing agreement that included an explicit no-contest clause.3 1 The licensee
then challenged the validity of the patent again. The Federal Circuit found the
clause enforceable, holding that an accused infringer is contractually estopped
from challenging a patent if the accused infringer (1) had previously challenged
the validity of the patent, (2) had an opportunity to conduct discovery on
validity issues, and (3) voluntarily dismissed the litigation under a settlement
agreement containing a clear and unambiguous no-contest clause. The policy of
settling disputes had outweighed the policy of encouraging the free exchange of
ideas.32
In Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts,33 the Federal Circuit expanded its
Flex-Foot decision by stating that "clear and unambiguous" no-contest clauses
in settlement agreements are enforceable even in the absence of prior
litigation.34  The court justified its approach by referring to a strong
jurisprudential policy in favor of settling litigation. Lear was distinguished on
the grounds that it did not involve a no-contest clause.
Precedent from other circuits, however, lead in a very different direction.
In Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertising Co., " the
Ninth Circuit held unenforceable a settlement agreement that restricted the
ability to challenge the patent's validity. The court reasoned that no-contest
30. It is interesting to note that different jurisdictions around the world have also
adopted clashing rules. The European Court found a no-contest clause to be invalid as an infringement
of European antitrust law, based on the view that "the public interest in ensuring an essentially free
system of competition and therefore in the removal of a monopoly perhaps wrongly granted to the
licensor must prevail over any other consideration." Case 193/83 Windsurfing Int'l v. Comm'n, 1986
E.C.R. 611, 663-64 (E.C.J.). The European Union Technology Transfer Block Exemption takes a more
nuanced approach under which no-contest clauses must undergo a rule of reason analysis. Commission
Regulation 772/2004, art. 5(l)(c), 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11, 16. However, the Commission recently
proposed changing the Block Exemption so that these termination clauses would not be automatically
exempted. Commission Regulation (EU) 316/2014, art. 5(l)(b), 2014 O.J. (L 93) 17, 22. Termination-
upon-challenge clauses are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. The Israeli Supreme Court applied the
licensee estoppel doctrine to block a challenge by a licensee. CA 4788/08 Cellopark v. Movidon [2009]
(Isr.). Yet a narrow reading of the case suggests that the ruling may have been affected by the unique
benefits derived by the licensee from exclusivity as well as the fact that the decision was part of
injunction proceedings. The Israeli Block Exemption for Agreements for the Execution of Research and
Development also does not automatically exempt no-contest clauses, while exempting termination
clauses. Antitrust Rules (Block Exemption for Agreements for the Execution of Research and
Development) - 2006, Section 8(a)(2).
31. Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
32. Id. at 1367-68.
33. Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 619 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
34. Id. at 1363; see also Diversity Lever, Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
1999).




clauses conflict with the policy articulated in Lear. 3 6 It also determined that
settlement agreements should not be treated distinctly from licensing
agreements, given the ability of parties to "couch licensing agreements in the
form of settlement agreements."37 Finally, the court stated that the policies in
favor of "free competition in ideas not meriting patent protection" supersede
the policy favoring the settlement of disputes.38
This case may be easy to overlook since it was decided before the creation
of the Federal Circuit, which has adopted a different approach. However, the
Second Circuit has recently adopted a similar view. Rates Technology, Inc. v.
Speakeasy, Inc. centered on a clear no-contest clause in which the licensee
promised it would not challenge the validity of the patent "anywhere in the
world." 3 9 The Second Circuit found this clause unenforceable, basing its
decision on an understanding that Lear "establish[ed] a 'balancing test' for
weighing the 'public interest in discovering invalid patents' against other
competing interests."4 0 The court argued that "[i]f no-challenge clauses in pre-
litigation agreements were held to be valid and enforceable, Lear's strong
policy favoring full and free use of ideas in the public domain could be evaded
through the simple expedient of clever draftsmanship."'1 The court
acknowledged the high cost of patent litigation and the risk imposed on the
patent holder,42 but nonetheless reasoned that these costs were less important
than the policy consideration of discovering invalid patents, at least when no-
contest agreements are entered into prior to the initiation of any litigation.
What explains the apparent divergence between the rulings of the Federal
Circuit and the Ninth and Second Circuits? Theories abound. Perhaps, when
deciding Flex-Foot, the Federal Circuit made a distinction between pre-
litigation and post-litigation settlement agreements.4 3 The court may have been
driven by the fact that the licensee signed a no-contest clause after performing
36. Id. at 427. For additional cases holding that no-contest clauses are unenforceable
under Lear, see Alfred C. Server & Peter Singleton, Licensee Patent Validity Challenges Following
MedImmune: Implications for Patent Licensing, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 243, 399 (2011).
37. Massillon-Cleveland-Akron, 444 F.2d at 427.
38. Id.; see also Callaway Golf Co. v. Kappos, 802 F. Supp. 2d 678, 687 (E.D. Va.
2011) ("[The plaintiff has not] demonstrated that the public interest in enforcement of settlement
agreements outweighs the public interest in patent validity.").
39. Rates Tech., Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2012). The
Federal Circuit transferred this case to the Second Circuit because the Federal Circuit did not have
jurisdiction. The Second Circuit was careful to distinguish Federal Circuit precedents such as Flex-Foot,
in particular on the ground that this case deals with a settlement agreement signed before any litigation,
while Flex-Foot deals with an agreement signed after some litigation had already taken place. The
Second Circuit also emphasized that they were, in any event, not directly bound by the Federal Circuit
precedent in Baseload.
40. Id. at 168 (quoting Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335
F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2003)).
41. Id. at 171.
42. Id. at 172.
43. However, this logic cannot apply to Baseload Energy, which involved a pre-
litigation settlement agreement. Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 619 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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discovery, on the theory that discovery provides an exhaustive opportunity for
the parties to weigh the validity of a patent.44 Alternatively, the court may have
been motivated by the principle of res judicata.45 The court may have thought
there was no justification to allow the licensee to repeatedly impose high
discovery costs on the patent holder. More simply, the court may have thought
that the right to challenge was abused without a legitimate justification.
Yet the language of Baseload Energy indicates a broader divergence
between the circuits, which could be read as implying that the Federal Circuit
has adopted the view that, in general, certainty in contracting and avoiding
litigation costs will be the prevailing policy considerations.4 6 In principle, this
line of reasoning can extend beyond settlements to all licensing agreements
with explicit no-contest clauses.
Arguably, this view from the Federal Circuit clashes not with only with
the Ninth and Second Circuits, but also with the Supreme Court. In
MedImmune, the Court placed a higher value on patent invalidation than it did
on litigation avoidance.47 However, some have read MedImmune as providing
parties with considerable freedom to tailor their relationships to meet business
needs, including the freedom to put explicit no-contest clauses in their
contracts.48 This reading is based on the Court's emphasis on the fact that the
parties did not include a clause limiting the licensee's right o challenge the
patent and thereby contracting out of the uncertainties created by a patent
challenge.4 9  The Federal Circuit's view may also be understood to conflict
with the view the Court recently took in Actavis, which emphasizes the
importance of invalidating unwarranted patents and enabling competition.50
44. For a suggestion that courts would find no-challenge clauses in settlement
agreements to be enforceable as long as the question of the patent validity arose and was subject to
discovery, see Andrew D. Kasnevich & Debodhonyaa Sengupta, Licensee Estoppel: The Lear Doctrine,
Rates v. Speakeasy, and Other Applications, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N (Feb. 21, 2012),
http://www.martindale.com/intellectual-property-law/articleSughrue-Mion-PLLC_1686518.htm. If
decisive weight is given to the fact that discovery was performed, the same logic might apply to bar
licensees who carefully checked the patent's validity before entering a contract.
45. See Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1368.
46. For this line of argument, see, for example, In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013);
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005); and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (1lth Cir. 2003).
47. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives
to Innovate after MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH, L.J. 971, 982-83 (2009).
48. Id. at 976.
49. Id. at 991. The absence of a discussion is read as an invitation to rethink Lear's
priorities. Lear is distinguished on the basis of information: the specific clauses alert potential licensees
to the restriction and thus further the public interest by strengthening incentives to examine the patent
prior to the agreement. This argument is problematic if we assume that, before Lear, parties assumed
that Automatic Radio was good law, and that any challenge would be prohibited under the doctrine of
licensee estoppel.
50. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013). The extent of this clash
depends on the breadth one gives to the unique facts of Actavis, which involved a reverse payment





Challenge-penalty provisions can take many forms. They may include
termination-upon-challenge clauses that give the patent holder the right to
terminate the contract in the event of a challenge, causing the licensee to lose
all or most of the rights granted under the agreement. Alternatively, they may
relate to royalties. For example, the licensing agreement may specify that the
royalty rate will increase when a challenge is brought or when a challenge
fails." Challenge penalties may go beyond the specific license, affecting the
parties' relationship in other areas. For example, the patent holder might limit
the transfer of information about new technologies to the licensee in the event
of a challenge. Penalties might also take the form of procedural impediments
such as mandatory arbitration or might require that the licensee pay the patent
holder's litigation costs.
Challenge penalties can even come in the form of benefits. Instead of
punishing the licensee for bringing a challenge, the patent holder could reward
him for not challenging. In some cases, a patent holder may agree to return
some of the royalties to the licensee at the end of the contract term, under the
condition that no challenge be brought.52
But all these challenge-penalty clauses share a common trait: they reduce
the licensee's motivation to challenge the patent, thereby reducing the risk that
the patent holder will have to undergo litigation. They vary mainly in the
strength of this effect.
The validity of challenge-penalty clauses is not always clear, and remains
an important question.54 While a limitation on a right to challenge erects a legal
barrier, challenge clauses can raise an economic barrier of no less consequence.
Lear shed light on the validity of at least some challenge-penalty clauses.
While the agreement in Lear did not contain a no-contest clause, it contained a
royalty-payment provision that acted as a challenge-penalty clause because it
required the licensee to continue paying royalties during the pendency of the
patent challenge. The Court noted that this provision, by itself, could frustrate
incentives to challenge, given that the Hatch-Waxman Act grants exclusivity only to the first challenger,
and entry into a pharmaceutical market involves additional high barriers, such as approval by the FDA.
51. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 47, at 1001-03.
52. Stephanie Chu, Operation Restoration: How Can Patent Holders Protect
Themselves from Medlmmune?, 6 DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 1, ¶ 16 (2007).
53. We preclude from the analysis provisions that increase royalties in a post-
unsuccessful-challenge period that reflect the enhanced strength of the patent. See Amado v. Microsoft
Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
54. For example, in both Lear and Medlmmune, termination-upon-challenge clauses
were not challenged. See Chu, supra note 52, at T$ 7-8; Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 47, at 999-1001,
1003-05; Dmitry Karshtedt, Contracting for a Return to the USPTO: Inter Partes Reexaminations as the
Exclusive Outlet for Licensee Challenges to Patent Validity, 51 INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 309, 340-42, 349-
352 (2011); Christian Chadd Taylor, No-Challenge Termination Clauses: Incorporating Innovation
Policy and Risk Allocation into Patent Licensing Law, 69 IND. L.J. 215, 244-46, 251-53 (1993) (arguing
that termination clauses should be legal).
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the important goal of eliminating invalid patents, as it would have encouraged
the patent holder to postpone a final determination regarding the patent's
validity and could have deterred the licensee from bringing the patent challenge
in the first place.55 The Court held that this provision was not enforceable as it
clashed with public interest in the full and free use of ideas in the public
domain.5 6 This ruling, and especially its reasoning, provides a guiding light in
the search for the answer to the enforceability of these clauses. It prohibited a
challenge-penalty provision that limited the probability of a patent challenge,
but it did not completely prevent one.
The challenge penalty in Lear was relatively weak-at most, the licensee
would pay royalties for a longer period. It might be argued that if even a
provision that exerts a weak deterrent effect on the licensee's incentives to
challenge a patent is prohibited, challenge penalties that create stronger
disincentives should be prohibited as well. Indeed, the majority of relevant
post-Lear circuit and district court opinions prohibited contract provisions that
clashed with Lear's public policy.5 7
Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp. provides an example." There, the licensee
refused to pay royalties for using a modified version of the patented product.
When the patent holder sued for infringement, the licensee defended on the
ground that the patent was invalid. The patent holder then terminated the
exclusive license, claiming that a provision in the contract allowed him to do so
if the licensee stopped paying royalties. The Seventh Circuit interpreted these
facts as showing that the patent holder had terminated the contract because the
licensee had raised the question of validity. The court prohibited this action,
stating that the policy considerations found to be determinative in Lear have
equal force in this situation, given the "chilling effect on meritorious challenges
to patents" that results from the threat of termination.59 Some courts have gone
even further and allowed licensees to deposit royalties in an escrow account
during the time of the challenge.60
This policy experienced a significant turnaround when the Federal Circuit
was created and given exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases.
According to Server and Singleton, the Federal Circuit seems to take the stance
that a licensee who challenges a patent "can be subject to consequences that
could constitute a disincentive to make the challenge in the first place, despite
the public interest . . . in eliminating invalid patents."6 1 The court emphasized
goals that were not addressed in Lear, including stimulating innovation through
patent protection, settling disputes, stability and contractual freedom. The court
55. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673-74 (1969).
56. Id.
57. Server & Singleton, supra note 36, at 260-397.
58. Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974).
59. Id. at 1092.
60. E.g., Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Moraine Prods., 509 F.2d I (6th Cir. 1974).




adopted a challenge-but-face-the-consequences approach, which encompassed
almost all contractual challenge clauses. 62
Under this approach, the court found that all challenge penalties it
scrutinized were categorically legal unless specifically prohibited by the
Supreme Court. For example, in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, the Federal
Circuit effectively held that license provisions giving patent holders the right to
terminate licenses when licensees bring validity challenges and stop paying
royalties are enforceable.6 3 In a subsequent case, the court also barred licensees
from making payments to an escrow account during litigation, arguing that
"'until invalidity is proven, the [patent holder] should ordinarily be permitted to
enjoy the fruits of his invention."'4 Such decisions rely, at heart, on
differentiating Lear: in seeming contrast to Lear's policy favoring challenges,
the Federal Circuit opted not to allow a licensee to "avoid facing the
consequences that [raising a challenge] would bring."6 5 One member of the
court even called Lear "outmoded" and contrary to the "national interest" in
encouraging innovation.66
Given this circuit clash, it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court
will adopt the Federal Circuit's view of challenge-penalty clauses or establish a
wider application of the Lear policies, similar to what it did in MedImmune.
Scholars are divided on the validity of different challenge-penalty clauses.6 7
We note that that courts have generally not found that either no-contest or
challenge-penalty clauses, by themselves, constitute patent misuse or an
antitrust violation.68
62. For a good overview of this approach, see id. at 354-90.
63. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Cordis Corp.
v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (vacating an order enjoining the appellant from
terminating a licensing agreement).
64. Cordis Corp., 780 F.2d at 995 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chemical
Corp., 567 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1977)).
65. Id.; Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 11, 16 (Fed. Cl. 1994), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 226 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
66. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(Newman, J., concurring). Interestingly, in 1986, the Department of Justice supported an unsuccessful
bill making termination-upon-challenge clauses valid. Taylor, supra note 54, at 215.
67. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 47; Taylor, supra note 54, at 217-29
(arguing that the validity of such clauses falls within the grey zone); John W. Schlicher, Patent
Licensing, What to Do After Medlmmune v. Genentech, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 364, 388
(2007) (asserting that such clauses are valid).
68. E.g., Panther Pumps & Equip. Co., Inc. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 231-32
(7th Cir. 1972), (regarding no-challenge clauses); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366
F. Supp. 220, 232 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd, 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1975). But see Bendix Corp. v. Balax,
Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1972) (stating that a no-challenge clause remains in effect after the
termination of the agreement).
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II. The Competing Interests
A. Relevant Considerations
Which rule regulating no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses best
serves social welfare? To answer this question, one must decide what the
relevant considerations are and then balance these factors. First, we determine
which considerations should be given priority, and under which circumstances.
Second, we determine the set of rules courts could adopt that best furthers these
considerations, taking into account the expected effects of these rules on market
behavior. To our knowledge, neither courts nor scholars have yet performed a
thorough economic analysis of this question.
We first note that patent law does not directly enter into the equation.
While patent law allows patent holders to license, it does not grant them the
right to be free from challenges.6 9 While patents are presumed valid because
they are examined by a government agency, the mere existence of the patent
does not shield it from a future challenge. On the contrary, patents are
understood to be probabilistic in the sense that some uncertainty remains with
regard to their validity and scope.7 0 Patent law does not prevent anyone with
standing from challenging a patent during its duration, given the social benefit
that arises from invalidating unwarranted patents.7 1 Patent law thus cannot be
construed as expressly or implicitly granting a patent holder the right to protect
his patent by preventing challenges to its validity.
The second consideration that we will take off the table is that of good
faith in contractual relationships, to which many courts have given much
weight.72 The theory on which the principle of good faith is invoked in this
context is simple: by committing to a no-contest or a challenge-penalty clause,
the licensee specifically agreed to erect obstacles to a future validity challenge.
As this promise is not without value, the licensee most likely received a
reciprocal benefit, such as lower up-front payments.
The theory of good faith in contractual relationships is simple, but
incomplete. It is relevant with regard to the enforcement of any contractual
commitment that was freely bargained between two parties with comparable
bargaining strength and skill, even when such agreements impose negative
externalities on third parties. But the policy of honoring contractual obligations
69. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2233 (2013).
70. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395
(2003) (asserting that patents do not confer an absolute right to exclude).
71. This fact is echoed in the Supreme Court's Actavis decision, in which the Court
stated that an important patent-related policy is to "eliminat[e] unwarranted patent grants so the public
will not 'continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification."'
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)).
72. We note that the doctrine of licensee estoppel essentially predates that of good
faith in American law. For more on the good faith doctrine, see Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, Good




is relevant only when parties assume that no-contest and challenge-penalty
clauses will be enforced by the court. Thus, the broader question is whether
public policy concerns call for validating, or invalidating, such contractual
terms. If public policy demands that these clauses not be honored, or at least
indicates the circumstances under which they will not be honored, then the
policy of honoring contractual obligations becomes less compelling.
Accordingly, we ignore this policy for the purposes of determining the broader
effects that no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses have on social welfare.
A third consideration, contractual stability and certainty, is more
important. To determine how much weight the concern for contractual stability
should receive, we must ask what this policy seeks to protect. One possible
answer relates to long-term investments, especially sunk costs. This
consideration is mostly relevant to the licensee, who is usually the party that
invests in the production and marketing of patent-based products. Yet since the
licensee is the one who chooses whether or not to disrupt the status quo by
bringing a challenge, the fact that a licensee chooses to challenge indicates that
the licensee expects to recover these investments without the contract, if the
challenge succeeds.
What about the long-term considerations of the patent holder? For one
thing, he does not have any legal guarantees that the patent will not be
challenged and invalidated by third parties. Furthermore, as we show below,
social welfare is generally increased when unwarranted patents are invalidated.
The most challenging aspect of this issue is the contractual stability of other
licensees whose investments would also be affected in the event of a challenge.
But once again, this consideration does not bear decisive weight, as the contract
includes an inherent risk that the patent will be invalidated by third party
challenges. Also, prohibiting challenges because they disrupt the contractual
status quo would allow market players to artificially keep prices above
competitive levels, thereby harming buyers, as elaborated below. Thus while
contractual stability is an important consideration, it need not play a major role
in our analysis.
A fourth consideration, freedom of contract, is also relevant to our
analysis. Yet it is undisputed that freedom of contract is not absolute, and only
applies if it serves to further social welfare. Moreover, this consideration is
logistically difficult to apply in the case at hand. For example, were it possible
to determine, at the time the contract is signed or the patent is challenged,
which patents are unimportant to society, then it might make sense not to
prohibit any contractual limitations to their validity (such as a de minimis rule).
We are doubtful whether such a determination can be efficiently and effectively
made by the parties or by the courts. So, this consideration can also be put
aside. In all other cases, however, freedom of contract must be weighed against
competing considerations.
A fifth-and, we conclude, overriding-consideration focuses on ridding
the economy of unwarranted patents. How important is it to invalidate
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unwarranted patents? Empirical studies of the patent system reveal that
mistakes by the PTO have imposed significant costs on society, both in terms
of monetary costs and further innovation.7 3 One well-known example involves
the wide patent granted to George Selden, which was alleged "to cover every
modem car driven by any form of petroleum vapor."7 4 The patent led to a
significant slowdown in the development of the U.S. automobile industry until
it was eventually invalidated one year before its expiration date. Other
examples abound.
The probability of these mistakes is not negligible.75 The recent Supreme
Court decision in Actavis also signified the importance of challenging
unwarranted patents. The Court states that pay-for-delay agreements-which,
like no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses, disincentivize patent
challenges-harm social welfare because they potentially delay competition.76
The Court emphasized that an anticompetitive harm is created even when
limiting a patent challenge prevents a small amount of competition.77
73. Excessive patent protection can reduce innovation by precluding subsequent
innovations by others. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, A Model of Discovery, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 337 (2009); Josh Lerner, The Empirical Impact of Intellectual
Property Rights on Innovation: Puzzles and Clues, 99 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 343
(2009).
74. U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (filed Nov. 5, 1895); see Electric Vehicle Co. v. C. A.
Duerr & Co., 172 F. 923, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
75. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 6.
76. In pay-for-delay agreements (otherwise known as reverse payment agreements),
the patent holder pays a potential patent-challenger of his patent for not challenging the patent, thereby
delaying this third party's entry into the market. In Actavis, the Supreme Court stated that pay-for-delay
agreements can harm social welfare when they delay competition or otherwise limit the risk of
competition. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that, by preventing even a small risk of competition,
limitations on patent challenges create anticompetitive harm. While recognizing the public value of
settling disputes, the Court applied a relatively narrow rule of reason under which a settlement will be
found anticompetitive unless justified on grounds other than harming competition, such as payment for
services or the avoidance of litigation costs if the patent is challenged. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2233 (2013).
Some important differences exist between pay-for-delay agreements and licensing
agreements. The latter are ongoing, they may further social welfare (through the efficient diffusion of
new products or processes in the market), and they are generally based on the assumption that the patent
is valid, at least when the contract is signed. Furthermore, the delay in competition that they cause is
somewhat different. Licensees already operate in the market, albeit with restrictions contained in their
licenses, so the anticompetitive harm stems from restricting the entry of third parties into the market. By
contrast, in pay-for-delay agreements the harm includes the prevention of the entry of the potential
patent challenger. These differences manifest themselves in the legal rules that are applied. While pay-
for-delay agreements are challenged under antitrust laws, courts have generally rejected the application
of antitrust doctrines, as well as patent misuse claims, to no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses.
Courts have instead analyzed them under contract law and general doctrines of public policy. See
generally Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1972). In some
circumstances, however, licensing restrictions may restrict competition even more than pay-for-delay
agreements. Furthermore, parties can take advantage of these restrictions later in the contract term to
limit patent challenges and ensure that they both gain while the public loses. Whether the differences
between restrictive licensing agreements and pay-for-delay agreements justify the difference in legal
regimes that currently apply to them is beyond the scope of this Article.
77. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
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B. Best Challengers oflnvalid Patents
We therefore must consider who is in the best position to identify and
challenge invalid patents. For the reasons described in Part I, the PTO cannot
be relied upon to rigorously distinguish between valid and invalid patent
applications.78 The patent system includes a place for private parties to identify
and challenge invalid patents. But who is in the best position to perform this
role? If third parties can be relied upon to invalidate unwarranted patents then
there may be no need to restrict no-contest or challenge-penalty clauses.
However, we suspect that in many contexts, this is unlikely to be the case. Even
though some third parties may be in a good position to identify invalid patents,
they often lack the incentive to bring challenges. Without a significant
comparative advantage over potential competitors, the profit that the third party
would make in the competitive marketplace that could result from invalidating
the patent might not be enough to compensate for the cost of the suit. This
problem can be remedied by giving a prize to parties that successfully
challenge invalid patents. The Hatch Waxman Act, for example, gives third
parties a prize-a short but lucrative period of exclusivity-when they are the
first to successfully challenge an invalid drug patent.79 This unique
arrangement, however, does not apply to patents in other fields.so In the
absence of such an arrangement, the incentives of third parties to challenge
patents-either directly, by bringing declaratory judgment actions, or
indirectly, by infringing and risking a suit by the patent holder-may be
weakened due to the hold-up problem: each would wait for the other to invest
in the challenge and then free-ride on the results.
In Lear, the Supreme Court assumed that "[1]icensees may often be the
only individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability
of an inventor's discovery."8 1 Indeed, there are several reasons why the
licensee's ability and incentive to challenge the patent may be substantially
stronger than a third party's.
First and foremost, the licensee, unlike third parties, actually produces
based on the patent. Furthermore, the licensee may possess prior expertise in
dealing with similar technologies or products. This expertise may be the reason
that the patent holder chose to grant the license to that particular license rather
than one of the other potential contenders. For these reasons, the licensee is in a
strong position to determine whether the patent is invalid.
78. Should the assumption regarding the PTO's efficiency change, the rules governing
licensing agreements might also need to change accordingly.
79. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. §
355 (2012).
80. The Hatch-Waxman Act only applies to the pharmaceutical industry, which is also
subject to regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
81. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
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The licensee's financial incentives to challenge the patent may also be
stronger than those of third parties. This will be the case when either of two
conditions is met: (1) the royalties paid to the patent holder are so high that the
licensee's profits will increase even if the patent is invalidated and the market
becomes more competitive,82 or (2) the licensee enjoys a significant
comparative advantage over his potential competitors (for example, first-mover
advantage, lower production costs, or reputation) that would enable him to reap
supra-competitive profits even after the invalidation of the patent.
A licensee faces some inherent barriers to bringing a challenge, however.
For the challenge to be profitable, the expected benefits of bringing the
challenge must exceed expected costs. "Challenge costs" include the direct
costs of litigating the patent's validity and the indirect costs resulting from the
effect of the challenge on the parties' business relationship. High challenge
penalties may add to these costs, thus reducing the licensee's incentive to
challenge the validity of the patent. That said, the patent holder may not always
wish to impose these costs. For example, a patent holder's motivation to
activate a termination clause would be significantly reduced if it would be
difficult and costly to locate an equally efficient licensee or if it would take a
new licensee a long time to enter the market and generate revenues.
Automatic termination of the license upon challenge presents an
additional risk for the licensee. Should the challenge fail, the licensee may be
liable for infringement if he continues to use the patent during the litigation
period. The licensee might also be prevented from using other types of
information, including know-how, that formed part of the licensing contract.
Furthermore, if the parties are repeat players, the challenge may reduce
the patent holder's incentives to contract with the licensee in the future. This
may be likely if the patent holder continues to invent in the area or holds
important knowledge.
The costs of the challenge may also extend beyond the relationship
between the patent holder and the licensee. A challenge can affect the general
reputation of the licensee and, consequently, the willingness of other patent
holders to license their patents to him. The licensee might also be hurt by the
market response to the challenge. For example, uncertainty about the patent
validity may lead to a decrease in demand for his products during the period of
the challenge.83 Third parties may also be able to terminate or revise their
82. For example, suppose that the product can be produced at a cost of $1 per unit,
that the license fee is $8 per unit, and that when there is a single producer, that producer will maximize
his profits by selling one hundred units for $10 per unit. Further, suppose that if the patent is invalidated,
two more firms will enter the market, and that three hundred units will be sold at $3 per unit. If the
license is valid, the single producer makes a profit of $ 100. If the license is invalidated, the producer
makes $200.
83. Importantly, a court declaration of invalidity is good not only against the parties to





contracts with the licensee because of their mutual mistake with regard to the
validity of the patent. Many of these challenge costs would be incurred
regardless of whether the patent is invalidated.
This analysis leads to an important conclusion. A challenge often imposes
significant costs on the licensee. Accordingly, it might be preferable for him
not to rock the boat. Any no-contest or challenge-penalty terms in the contract,
and the extent to which those clauses are enforced by courts, will deter the
licensee from challenging the patent. By piling onto licensees' natural
disincentives, these clauses can create insurmountable legal and economic
barriers for the parties that would otherwise be the most willing and able to
challenge invalid patents.
To conclude this analysis, we compare the incentives of the licensees to
challenge the patent to those of third parties.84 We find that the balance of the
costs and benefits makes licensees the most appropriate and likely challengers.
As we have noted, the benefits that accrue to third parties from successful
patent challenges might not be as high as those that accrue to the licensee, who
pays royalties. Without a significant comparative advantage, third parties may
not be able to make sufficient profit in a competitive marketplace to justify the
expenditure on litigation.
On the other hand, however, it is less costly for third parties to challenge
the patent. Of course, they must pay the direct cost of litigating the patent,
whether they choose to bring a declaratory judgment action or to infringe and
defend themselves in court by challenging the validity of the patent. But the
other challenge costs would be lower for third parties. Third party challengers
would not be subject to challenge penalties, regardless of whether courts would
choose to enforce these contractual clauses. Furthermore, while both third party
and licensee challengers can expect to suffer costs from the probable response
of the market to the challenge, the licensees face higher costs because they
already operate in the market.
Thus, third parties face both lower benefits and lower costs in challenging
a patent than do licensees. However, in many cases, it is plausible that the
benefits from a successful challenge would remain low (because of the
difficulty in profiting in a competitive marketplace) while the costs would
actually be substantial. Furthermore, as noted above, each third party might
wait for another to challenge the patent in order to free-ride on the outcome of
the litigation without bearing its costs. Accordingly, the incentives of licensees
84. The analysis assumes that the third party consciously challenges the patent, either
by bringing a challenge or by consciously infringing and risking a suit by the patent holder. Indeed,
many patents are challenged as part of infringement suits. We do not analyze the remedies courts grant
for infringement or the burden of proof necessary to show infringement. Should such remedies be low,
or the burden of proof high, third parties' incentives to infringe would of course increase. But even if
many patents are challenged through infringement suits, licensees still play an important role in
challenging patents. The current law limits potential challenges by allowing no-contest and challenge-
penalty clauses. Thus, enabling licensees to challenge is imperative for increasing challenges overall.
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to challenge, as well as their ability to obtain the relevant information, might
well be stronger. This analysis therefore supports the Supreme Court's
conclusion that licensees are often in the best place to challenge patents.
We have now established that the policy of honoring contractual
obligations can be taken off the table for the purposes of this analysis, and that
considerations of contractual stability and freedom of contract should be
balanced against the goal of invalidating unwarranted patents. The next step is
to determine which rules governing the legality and scope of no-contest and
challenge penalty clauses best serve social welfare. We will analyze the effects
of potential rules on the relevant market players to ensure that the chosen rule
indeed harnesses the parties' private incentives to the goal of furthering social
welfare. We do so by modeling the decision tree of the patentee and the
licensee. The practical difficulty of measuring or approximating all relevant
variables requires us to base our analysis on estimates.
III. Formal Analysis
A. The Economic Model
We assume that the patent creates a monopoly in the market. The model
contains two time periods. The parties make a series of decisions before the
start of the first period and in between the first and second periods. The parties
then are paid as a consequence of the decisions.
The model starts with the PTO granting a patent to "P," the patent holder.
The patent is valid for two periods. The patent protects a product with a strictly
decreasing and continuous demand function.85 The parties share a common
belief as to the likelihood that the patent would be upheld in court if a challenge
were brought.
There is a large set of ex ante identical firms that can produce the product
by making a one-time fixed investment and then paying a production cost. To
simplify the analysis, we make a standard assumption that the total cost
function is sub-additive, meaning that one firm will always be able to produce a
given quantity at a lower cost than could a combination of two or more firms.
We make no other assumptions about the level of the fixed investment or the
nature of the production cost.
Next, P chooses one of the firms and enters contractual negotiations
licensing the use of the patent by the firm. We will refer to the firm as L (for
licensee). For simplicity, we assume that the contract relates exclusively to the
use of the patent by L. At this stage, the parties must decide what contractual
terms to include in the contract-in particular, they must decide whether to
85. By "strictly decreasing," we mean that an increase in price will cause a decrease in
the quantity demanded. By "continuous," we mean, roughly, that a very small change in the price will




include a no-contest clause or a challenge-penalty clause. If the latter is
included, they must decide upon the size of the penalty. We assume that the
penalty is a sum of money payable by L to P in the event of a challenge. In
practice, of course, contracts may also include non-monetary sanctions such as
the termination of the contract. The sum of money represents the cost of these
sanctions to L. This assumption ignores the possibility that the cost of the
sanction may vary depending on L's actions.86
P and L must also determine how L will pay for the right to use the patent.
We assume that the parties choose a payment scheme in the form of royalties-
a fraction of L's profits that must be paid to P.8 7 Royalties based on actual sales
enable the parties to base payments on the success of the patent-based product
or service, thereby eliminating the need to estimate the commercial value of the
patent before production commences.88 We also assume, for simplicity's sake,
that the parties have full and symmetric information and that there is no
uncertainty except with regard to the validity of the patent.89
Next, L decides the amount of the good to produce during the first period.
The first period occurs and the parties receive their profits.
At the end of the first period, P and L receive new information in the form
of a common signal about the likelihood that the patent would be upheld if
challenged.90 After receiving this new information, L chooses whether to
challenge the patent. L may only challenge the patent if allowed to do so by the
contract. If L chooses to challenge and is permitted to challenge, he must pay
both a litigation cost (which cannot be recovered)91 in addition to the challenge
penalty (if the contract contains an enforceable challenge-penalty clause). P
86. We assume that general equitable or contractual considerations do not form a legal
barrier to bringing a challenge.
87. Payments from L to P take the form of royalties, as is common in licensing
contracts. In practice, royalties are based on the level of production, which is easier to verify than the
level of profits. However, such royalty schemes are distortionary and would unnecessarily complicate
the present model, in which the level of profits is commonly known.
88. In practice, royalties also serve to divide the risk between the parties; however,
risk about future revenues is irrelevant in this model, as the demand is known and the parties are risk-
neutral. An alternative to royalties might be the outright sale of the patent for an upfront fee (or some
combination of an upfront payment and royalties). However, the licensee would have no incentive to
challenge a patent after sale, making this analysis uninteresting for our current purposes. We do predict,
however, that the prohibition of no-contest clauses should lead to an increase in sales of patents through
upfront cash payments rather than to licensing agreements with royalty payments. We shall later relax
the assumption that the payment is ongoing.
89. This assumption does not weaken our model. Though it might change the balance
between the parties, it will not significantly affect their decision whether or not to include the relevant
clauses.
90. To eliminate the possibility of strategic manipulation of the new information, we
assume a common signal reaches both parties concurrently. It would not be enough to simply assume
that each side receives independent, identical signals because it is possible that one side would hide the
new information to affect the behavior of the other side.
91. The model assumes that litigation costs are incurred when L decides to challenge
the patent. In a setting where L first infringes and then waits for a reaction, the costs are incurred if and
only if P decides to bring an infringement suit.
141
Yale Journal on Regulation
must then decide whether to defend the patent, and if he does so he must pay an
identical litigation cost.92 The model disregards non-contractual challenge
costs.
If the patent is both challenged by L and defended by P, the decision-
maker93 then decides whether the patent is valid.94 We will assume that the
decision is correct. If the patent is deemed invalid, the patented subject matter
returns to the public domain. We also assume that the contract is invalidated, so
that no future royalties are owed.95 If the patent is found valid, the original
contract remains in force.96
At this point, L chooses a quantity to produce during the second period. If
the patent has been invalidated, other firms in the market may also produce and
choose their production levels at this time. The parties then receive their profits
for the second period.
Before we analyze the different legal regimes, we wish to highlight two
features of the model. First, and again for simplicity, the model assumes that
only L may challenge the patent, and that this challenge may come only at the
end of the first period. However, our results would not be substantially different
if other firms in the market were given the ability to challenge the patent, or if
the patent challenge took place at the time that the patent was granted. This
conclusion follows from the fact that there are a large number of ex ante
identical firms. If the patent were invalidated at the beginning, firms would
enter the market until none made profits, assuming a perfectly competitive
market.97 As a consequence, no third party firm would have an incentive to
invest in litigation to challenge the patent.
In contrast, suppose that the patent were invalidated at the end of the first
period. L would enjoy a comparative advantage from being the first mover and
would make a profit. (The comparative advantage comes from the fact that L
would have already spent the fixed cost.) Since all the other firms would have
free entry to the market, for the reasons stated above none of them would profit.
As a result, no firm other than L has an incentive to challenge the patent. The
lesson here is that only L would have a sufficient incentive to challenge the
patent, as it has a comparative advantage over other firms in the market.98
92. L might also incur additional challenge costs, though this model disregards them.
93. The decision-maker may be a court or the PTO depending on the circumstances.
94. We assume the decision-maker chooses to uphold the patent with a probability
consistent with the parties' information.
95. Eliminating future royalties may require an additional legal step.
96. Of course, the contract would not be in force if it had been terminated, as might be
allowed under certain challenge-penalty clauses. In our model, termination costs are included in the
penalty.
97. There may be a negligible profit due to the fact that only an integer number of
firms may enter the market.
98. L would also have an incentive to challenge when royalties are so high that his





The second feature of the model we will highlight is that the expected
strength of the patent does not affect L's willingness to contract with P.
Because the patent will not be challenged by anyone other than L, nor at any
time other than at the end of the first period, the patent creates a monopoly that
is good for at least one period.
B. Comparing the Legal Options
We consider three possible legal regimes. In the first ("Total Restriction"),
neither no-contest clauses nor challenge-penalty clauses are allowed. In other
words, P is totally restricted from erecting any contractual barriers against
challenges to the validity of the patent. In the second regime ("Partial
Restriction"), some challenge-penalty clauses are permitted but no-contest
clauses are prohibited.99 Put differently, P is restricted from erecting legal
barriers to patent challenges, but may erect economic barriers. In the third
regime ("No Restriction"), both no-contest clauses and challenge-penalty
clauses are permitted. P is not restricted from creating legal or economic
barriers to challenges. The first and third rules may be thought of as the
extreme points on the spectrum of possible rules, with the second rule lying in
the middle. Although these are the three main options, intermediate options
also exist; we address these intermediate options later in this Article.
1. Does Increasing Patent Challenges Increase Social Welfare?
Before analyzing the possible rules, we address an important question that
affects our choice of rule: Does challenging patents necessarily increase social
welfare? As a preliminary matter, a challenge will reduce the joint profits of P
and L for two reasons: (1) the wasteful expenditure on litigation, and (2) if the
patent is invalidated, the parties may see a decrease in second-period profits.
While L expects to benefit from invalidating the patent, L's gain will usually be
less (and will never be greater) than P's loss. After invalidation, other firms
may enter the market and take up market share, or L may increase production
to make entry unattractive for competitors. Either way, the total amount
produced is higher than the monopoly quantity, and L's second-period profits
will increase more than his revenues.
While the litigation cost is a clear social loss, the second factor-decrease
in P and L's joint second-period profits if the patent is invalidated-may entail
a social benefit, since an increase from the monopoly quantity will decrease the
deadweight loss. This saving will often be orders of magnitude higher than the
litigation costs. Invalidating an unwarranted patent has other positive social
99. We chose not to analyze a rule that allows no-contest clauses and prohibits
challenge-penalty clauses because its effects are similar to the third option, given that a no-contest
clause is a stricter restriction than a challenge-penalty clause.
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benefits, namely in that it limits a firm's incentives to file for a weak or invalid
patent.00
Although a successful challenge will reduce the joint profits of P and L, it
will nevertheless increase L's individual profits because L will no longer have
to pay royalties.'0' The effects of this situation on social welfare are generally
positive. In the period following litigation, market-wide production will
increase, which will in turn cut deadweight loss. Social welfare will increase,
assuming that the decrease in the deadweight loss is higher than the litigation
costs.
It is possible, however, that a successful patent challenge will have a
negative effect on social welfare. This will happen in one of two situations.
First, if L uses his first-mover position to entrench himself and erect
insurmountable barriers to entry, there may be no increase in the market-wide
level of production. Consequently, there would be no reduction in deadweight
loss, and no increase in social welfare. In such a case, the challenge would
lower social welfare by the amount of the litigation costs. Admittedly, this case
is probably rare: in most industries with which we are familiar, the end of a
patent tends to spur more competition, though maybe not at the fully
competitive level. Second, even if there is a reduction in the deadweight loss, it
may still be outweighed by the parties' litigation costs. In such a case, L would
still choose to challenge, because he only internalizes his own litigation costs.
Yet even in this case, invalidating an unwarranted patent will have some
benefits, which are not accounted for in our model. First, ex ante incentives to
file for an invalid patent are reduced because P (and other potential patent
holders) will profit less from an invalid patent. Second, the market situation
may be more dynamic than our model assumes. If an unanticipated change
occurs in the market, other firms will be able to enter and compete. Third, there
are some limitations to the barriers that L can erect against other firms entering
the market post-invalidation. For example, assume L's advantages are founded
on exclusivity contracts with third parties. After L brings a challenge, those
third parties could challenge these contracts based on a claim of mutual mistake
about the validity of the patent or on other grounds. This challenge, in turn,
might introduce more competition into the market. Fourth, suppose that
royalties are based on the licensee's revenues or on the level of production.
Even if barriers to entry are high enough to allow L to retain a monopoly,
invalidating the patent-and thus eliminating the royalty-may lead L to
pursue a higher level of production. For these reasons, we generally view
challenges positively and look for rules that increase the probability of
100. Assuming symmetric information, an invalid patent can be thought of as a very
weak patent.
101. A challenge will lead to an increase in L's profits in those cases when L chooses




challenges, thereby increasing social welfare while limiting harms to other
important interests.
2. What Is the Best Legal Rule to Achieve this Result?
With the understanding that patent challenges tend to increase social
welfare, we now evaluate the three legal rules under the economic model. The
results below follow from the calculations included in the Appendix. Our first
finding is that if the licensee chooses to bring a challenge, the Total Restriction
and the Partial Restriction rules are equivalent in terms of their effects on social
welfare. Second, we show that, in practice, there will be no challenges under
the No Restriction rule. Third, if the licensee does not challenge, all three rules
have equivalent effects on social welfare. These results make intuitive sense. In
the event of a challenge, the challenge penalty is simply a transfer payment
between the parties, which does not impact social welfare. And if L does not
bring a challenge, L will produce the monopoly quantity in both periods of the
model.
The difference between the rules, in terms of welfare analysis, thus boils
down to the probability of a challenge. The results of the model in this regard
are as one might expect: L is most likely to challenge under a Total Restriction
rule, less likely under a Partial Restriction rule, and will not challenge under a
No Restriction rule. How much less likely is L to challenge under a Partial
Restriction rule than under a Total Restriction rule? It depends on the character
of challenge penalty. If the penalty is small enough, Partial Restriction becomes
very similar to Total Restriction. The two are identical when the challenge
penalty is zero. But if the penalty is sufficiently high, Partial Restriction can
become identical to No Restriction. Indeed, even under a Total Restriction rule,
L does not challenge all patents. The cost of challenging an extremely strong
patent is simply too high, given the low probability of success.
Another important consideration involves P's incentives to defend the
patent. A social loss occurs not only when an invalid patent goes unchallenged,
but also when a valid patent is challenged but not defended. (We assume that
the decision-maker does not err, but that an undefended patent is automatically
invalidated.) Not surprisingly, the model shows that P's behavior is the same
under both the Total Restriction and Partial Restriction rules. P will defend all
but the weakest patents: specifically those whose probability-adjusted expected
royalties in the second period are less than the cost of defending the patent.
Because the social gain from the patent is entirely captured by P, it seems
plausible that P's behavior is efficient under both of these rules. P's incentives
under a No Restriction regime are irrelevant because L will not bring a
challenge under this rule.
In the end, the best rule will be the one that aligns L's incentives to
challenge as closely as possible with the socially optimal level. To determine
which rule fulfills this goal, we need to compare: (a) the benefit that accrues to
145
Yale Journal on Regulation
L when the patent is invalidated; with (b) the benefit that accrues to society
when the patent is invalidated. The calculations show that L's incentives to
challenge are at the socially optimal level when the benefit to L is twice the
size of the benefit to society. L will challenge more than is socially optimal if
L's benefit from the invalidation is more than twice the social benefit, and less
than is socially optimal if the social benefit is larger than twice L's benefit.
This calculation holds under all three rules.10 2
Because L is most likely to challenge under Total Restriction, this rule is
the best of the three when the social benefit is larger than twice L's benefit.0 3
But a Partial Restriction may be optimal. If society's benefit is less than twice
L's benefit, Total Restriction will lead L to challenge more than is socially
optimal. In this case, welfare can be improved through a penalty, if that penalty
is not too large.104 The Partial Restriction rule will be optimal, if the penalty
can be constrained sufficiently. 05 The No Restriction rule will only be optimal
if social gains from a patent challenge are so small as to be outweighed by the
litigation cost, a condition that seems unlikely to hold in important cases. In
short, the No Restriction rule is probably never a good policy, while the Total
Restriction and the Partial Restriction rules can make sense in different
situations.
In order to sufficiently constrain challenge penalties in the Partial
Restriction scenario, a bright-line rule may make sense. In practice, it may be
difficult to establish the amount of economic harm that L incurs when the
challenge penalties are imposed. A bright-line rule would allow certain types of
challenge penalties and not others. While such a solution would not yield the
optimum in every situation, it might nonetheless prove better and more
consistent han other feasible solutions.
The model also shows that the goal of avoiding costly patent litigation
should not be given independent weight, like some courts have suggested.06
The private expense of such litigation is often outweighed by social benefits.'o7
A final conclusion arises from the model: two parties who think the patent
is weak may still want to contract with one another in order to use the patent's
102. Calculations can be found in the Appendix.
103. Even under Total Restriction the licensee may challenge too little; it may be
optimal to strengthen the licensee's incentives to challenge the patent in this case.
104. Alternatively, the situation can be improved by placing some limitations on the
applicability of the Total Restriction rule to ensure that it is not used unless social welfare will increase.
105. One potential way to craft the Partial Restriction rule would be to allow penalties
up to a limit, such as the patent holders' litigation costs. Such a limit would only serve as a rough
constraint, and courts would still need to determine whether the Partial Restriction rule is superior to the
Total Restriction rule.
106. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236-37 (2013).
107. The Supreme Court has recognized that litigation costs pose a cost to society
regardless of the outcome of the litigation, e.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236-37, and has therefore allowed
agreements that cover litigation costs. In our model we reach a somewhat different result: while we also
assume that litigation costs are a social cost, we conclude that these costs are not directly related to the




exclusivity for their joint benefit. P will receive royalties on a non-right and L
will control the market because of the exclusivity awarded by the license for an
unwarranted patent. This situation will most likely arise when third parties do
not share the information that the patent is weak or do not have sufficient
incentives to sue or to infringe the patent. Such an agreement is
anticompetitive. The value of such an agreement is maximized if L assures P
that he will not challenge the patent. A Total Restriction rule, and to a lesser
extent a Partial Restriction rule, will therefore partly reduce the occurrence of
such an agreement. A No Restriction rule would enable them.
C. Discussion: Additional Potential Effects
The model is necessarily a simplified understanding of reality and cannot
cover all potential effects of each rule. In this Section, we relax some of the
assumptions and discuss additional effects of the different rules that are not
captured by the model. Our approach ensures that all parameters are taken into
account and that the basic goal of licensing agreements-effective
dissemination of new patentable inventions through technology transfer-is not
harmed.
We address additional considerations that have been raised by courts and
scholars, including maintaining contract stability, promoting innovation,
encouraging private parties to efficiently allocate risk, and limiting costly
litigation. Such considerations are given primacy by the Federal Circuit, unless
they clash with the court's narrow interpretations of Lear and MedImmune.
They are also encouraged by patent law practitioners who argue that
MedImmune went too far.108 We show, however, that granting decisive weight
to such considerations does not serve social welfare. When analyzing the
effects of the different rules on social welfare, most of the literature to date has
focused on factors that weaken P's incentives to enter into an otherwise
efficient licensing agreement. Courts should also take into account
countervailing factors that strengthen P's incentives to enter into such licensing
agreements.
1. Effects on Patenting and Choice of Licensee
The model assumes that P will always contract with a licensee. Suppose,
instead, that P can produce the product on his own. Why, then, would P want to
license the patent at all? P's primary motivation is that L might produce at
lower cost than P can, incorporate the patent-based product with other products,
or reach the market more quickly or efficiently, leading to a surplus in which P
can share. This increase in allocative and productive efficiency creates a social
108. See, e.g., Chu, supra note 52.
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benefit. Consumers may enjoy the patent-based product more quickly and
potentially more cheaply, reducing the deadweight loss to society.
We thus must examine how the different legal rules might affect P's
decision to license his patent to an efficient L.109 Under the Total Restriction
rule and, to a lesser extent, under the Partial Restriction rule, P is legally
prevented from limiting the risk of L's challenge. In that case, P might decide
to produce and distribute the product internally, even at higher cost. This
scenario is especially likely to occur if P's potential losses from a challenge are
high, relative to the cost differences between the parties. Alternatively, P might
decide to license the patent to a less efficient firm that does not have the
resources, stamina, or knowledge to challenge the patent.110 In particular, P
may choose a firm that lacks a significant comparative advantage over other
potential producers, since it is often the comparative advantage that propels a
licensee to challenge the patent and capitalize on first-mover status. A third
possibility arises if the risk of challenges is high and the product cannot easily
be reverse-engineered. In this case, P might decide not to obtain the patent and
instead rely on trade secret protection. The patentable innovation thus might
never become part of the public domain. All three decisions would negatively
impact social welfare, creating an inefficient division of labor that would lead
to slower and less cost-efficient diffusion of innovation in the market.
These concerns have been raised in prior commentary.'1 But to make the
analysis complete, we must also consider forces pulling in the other direction.
In all three scenarios, the stronger the patent and the larger L's comparative
advantage in production, the more likely P will be to license to the most
efficient L. L's incentives to enter the contract increase, as does his willingness
to pay higher royalties that incorporate his ability to bring a challenge, thereby
countering at least part of P's reduced incentives to license. These effects limit
the probability that P will forego an otherwise efficient contract, especially if
he believes that his patent is strong and L is a more efficient producer than he
is.
109. We make several simplifying assumptions. First, we ignore the parties' costs of
locating each other and assume that P has perfect information with regard to the existence of potential
Ls and their respective comparative advantages. Second, we assume that neither party is obligated to
enter into contractual negotiations, such as a compulsory license. Rather, both will enter negotiations
only if their expected gain is positive. For similar assumptions, see Lucian Bebchuk & Omri Ben
Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001). That paper also provides a useful
framework for the analysis, which we have followed in some parts.
110. Two types of efficiencies are relevant here. One relates to productive or
marketing efficiency and the other to the ability to successfully challenge a patent. Firms may differ
with regard to both types.





The Total Restriction rule and, to a lesser extent, the Partial Restriction
rule, would also affect P's incentives to license to multiple firms. By granting
multiple licenses, P would reduce the comparative advantage that any one firm
would enjoy in the event of patent invalidation. The existence of more potential
competitors in the post-patent period would reduce the ability of any specific L
to enjoy first-mover advantages-and thus the incentive of any L to challenge
the patent in the first place. This results from the fact that patent invalidation
applies in general and not only with respect to the specific litigants and thus is a
public good that all can enjoy.
But P might suffer some losses from such an arrangement. If competition
ensues between the multiple Ls, P will receive lower royalties. This possibility
will limit P's incentives to grant multiple licenses. However, P's overall profits
will not necessarily be reduced, especially if he limits competition among Ls. P
can achieve this goal by designating a specific territory to each L.112 In
deciding whether to grant multiple licenses, P will balance the lower risk of
challenge against any loss of profits from this arrangement, which might result
if the Ls' productive efficiency is lower due to inefficient scales of production
or reduced incentives to enter into the contract.
In terms of social welfare, P's decision to license the patent to multiple Ls
creates mixed effects. On the one hand, it reduces the incentives of each L to
challenge the patent, and thus may let invalid patents survive. On the other
hand, the fact that there are more Ls implies that there will be more competition
once the patent is invalidated or expires.
3. Effect on Contractual Terms
Rules that prevent P from tying L's hands, such as Total Restriction and
Partial Restriction, would also affect other contractual terms. For example, the
model assumes that L will pay for the right to use the patent with ongoing
royalties based on profits. But once P is prevented from including no-contest
and challenge-penalty clauses, he might use other contractual solutions, such as
different forms of payment, to limit his risk of facing a challenge.
In some instances, P might demand higher upfront payment. This sunk
cost reduces the overall benefit L would receive from later invalidating the
patent, and consequently reduce the risk of L bringing a challenge."' (In the
112. Of course, if the patent is declared invalid, each L would immediately become a
potential competitor in all territories.
113. See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 47, at 974; Sean M. O'Connor, Using Stock and
Stock Options to Minimize Patent Royalty Payment Risks After MedImmune v. Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J.L.
& Bus. 381, 452-54 (2007). Such payments might include not only the payment for the right to use the
patent, but also for the transfer of know-how that is necessary in order to efficiently produce based on
the patent.
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extreme case, P would sell the patent to L.) This solution would limit the pool
of Ls from which P could choose, for two reasons. First, it requires high
upfront payments, which may be infeasible for some Ls due to capital
constraints.14 Second, it may transfer more risk to L than L will be prepared to
take. Three types of risk are particularly important: the patent might not be a
commercial success; it might be invalidated by another party; and new
information might reveal that the patent is unwarranted, reducing its value or
leading to its invalidation. The L who is best able to raise capital and bear the
risk may not be the one best positioned to produce and distribute the product."'
Yet, once again, P's incentives to demand upfront payment are reduced by
the counter-effects he may suffer from limiting the pool of potential Ls. The
stronger his patent and the stronger L's comparative advantage in production,
the weaker P's incentives to give up an otherwise efficient licensing agreement.
The literature also raises the possibility that a higher risk of challenge,
which would exist under Total Restriction and Partial Restriction rules, might
increase royalties. Put differently, L's agreement to contract for a lower risk of
challenge, through either a no-contest or challenge-penalty clause, is rewarded
with lower royalties.116 Where such clauses cannot be included in the contract,
P might compensate for the increased risk by charging higher royalties. Such
royalties might, in turn, increase the price to the final consumer, depending on
market structure, and also limit the number of potential Ls.117
Yet the real effect of these higher royalties on the parties' conduct might
be minimal. L will be compensated for the higher royalties by the freedom to
challenge the patent and the reduced risk that he would be contractually bound
to an invalid patent. Furthermore, P may even demand lower royalties under a
Total Prohibition or Partial Prohibition rule than he would if he were allowed to
include no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses in the contract."' When
royalties are low, L has less to gain from moving to a competitive regime by
challenging the patent. P might therefore engage in strategic contracting with
Ls that would otherwise have strong incentives to challenge the patent.
But while reduced royalties are beneficial for L, it is less clear how they
affect social welfare. Reduced royalties limit L's incentives to challenge an
invalid patent and can result in reduced prices for consumers.
114. It is also difficult to accurately determine the net present value of an expected
royalty stream. O'Connor, supra note 113.
115. These effects occur only if L cannot recoup the payments he made to P before the
patent was found invalid.
116. Cf Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 47, at 974.
117. John W. Schlicher, Patent Licensing, What to Do After Medlmmune v.
Genentech, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 364, 389-93 (2007).
118. A related option involves aligning the incentives of L and P through stock




4. Effects on Innovation
Prominent scholars have also suggested that no-contest and challenge-
penalty clauses increase the rewards to becoming a patentee, which in turn
influences market players' incentives to invest in innovation and diffuse novel
ideas. If this is true, prohibiting contractual constraints to patent challenges
would retard technological progress."9 Since P might lose revenue either if the
challenge is successful (litigation costs and lost royalties) or unsuccessful
(litigation costs), P has less incentive to invest in the first place.120
Prohibiting no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses, however, does not
necessarily limit incentives to innovate. Indeed, it might even increase them. It
is important first to reject the assumption that all patents are valid. In the real
world, a non-trivial number of patents are improperly granted.121 Thus, any
reduction in the value of becoming a patent holder will be roughly inversely
proportional to the strength of any given patent.12 2 L would not choose to
challenge, and a court would not invalidate, a strong patent. Therefore, Total
and Partial Restriction rules would not negatively affect investment in truly
novel and non-obvious innovations.'23 Plus, the weaker the patent, the lower
the social value of the underlying invention, and the smaller the potential social
harm from reduced investment in such patents. In fact, the higher incentives
that Ls have to challenge weaker patents would provide additional social value,
because it would keep weak patents away from the market. So long as we can
assume that courts correctly determine the validity of patents, true innovation
should not be significantly harmed by such challenges.
Because this conclusion is important in this larger debate, we offer the
following analysis to show that Ps are financially no worse off-and thus face
no disincentives to innovate-even under legal regimes that allow patent
challenges. First assume the PTO always decides correctly when granting
patents. Further, a specific innovator guesses there is a twenty-five percent
chance the PTO will reject his application as, for example, non-novel. His
investment decisions will be based on such a risk.
But now assume the PTO might be wrong, whereas a reviewing court will
always be correct. In this case, the PTO wrongly grants a patent, and P enters a
licensing contract with L. At some point, L challenges. The court correctly
invalidates the patent-which had a twenty-five percent chance of never being
granted in the first place, for which a rational P already accounted. Thus, P is
119. For a discussion of this type of risk, see, for example, Chu, supra note 52;
Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 47, at 974; and Taylor, supra note 54, at 253.
120. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 47, at 974.
121. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 6.
122. Of course, there may be uncertainty regarding the strength of the patent,
especially since patents are, by nature, supposed to be unique.
123. Incentives to challenge are also affected by the size of the potential market. Yet
the larger the market, the larger the potential social benefit from the challenge.
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no worse off than he was in the scenario where the PTO performs its job
correctly. In fact, P is better off. Until the patent was invalidated, P enjoyed
royalty payments that he otherwise would not have enjoyed.
P will only ever be worse off if he made investments based on the
presumed validity of the patent (such as additional research and evelopment)
that exceed his revenues. Yet even then, P might still be better off than in the
first scenario. By licensing to produce on the invalid patent, L assumes at least
part of the risk of overinvestment in production facilities and marketing
strategies. Thus, licensing an invalid patent will not make P financially worse
off, relative to the scenario in which the PTO is always correct, even if L later
brings a challenge.
Even if, as this analysis implies, Total and Partial Restriction rules do
reduce P's incentive to pursue weak patents, they remain preferable to a No
Restriction rule, which actively increases incentives to apply for weak or
invalid patents. In fact, no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses enable patent
holders to profit more from weak or invalid patents than from strong ones.124 A
strong patent needs less contractual protection since the probability that a court
will find it invalid is lower. But contractual safeguards like no-contest and
challenge-penalty clauses can equalize the threat of challenge to patents weak
and strong. As Elhauge and Kreuger argue, this equalization creates stronger
incentives to invest in weak, pseudo-innovation-based patents, which are
generally less costly to achieve. Yet their protection is more costly to society.
Therefore, a legal regime that produces the least incentive to invest in weak or
invalid patents-Total Restriction and, to a lesser extent, Partial Restriction-
will tend to increase social welfare.1 25 Furthermore, once the law induces
potential patentees of weak patents to refrain from filing, the average strength
of patents will be higher, which can lead to more contractual stability in the
market.
These innovation-related considerations also strengthen the case for legal
regimes that allow challenging invalid patents even in cases where invalidating
a patent simply entails a transfer from P to L and does not affect market prices
to final consumers. Patents often serve as a basis for other inventions or are
used together with other patents. Invalidating patents for supposed inventions
that rightfully belong in the public domain may increase follow-on innovation
or serve to reduce the anticommons problem. 126
Another concern that patent scholars raise is P's ability to contract out
commercial uncertainties, a goal which is especially important in emerging
124. See Einer Elhauge & Alex Kreuger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91
TEx. L. REv. 283, 294 (2012); Murat C. Mungan, Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives, 27 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 25 (2013). This consideration is based on the assumption that firms make conscious
decisions about the level of their innovation.
125. Mungan, supra note 124.




sectors where the value of the invention is not yet known.127 Innovation will
appear less attractive, the theory goes, if Ps cannot contract around market
uncertainty. It is important, however, to unbundle two types of risk. The first is
the risk that the market will not create high demand for the product. This risk is
shared between P and L through the royalty mechanism, and can be contracted
out to L entirely through the sale of the patent. Thus, no-contest and challenge-
penalty clauses do not affect this risk. The second is the risk that the patent will
be found invalid, and thus that P will no longer benefit from it. It is only to this
second type of risk that no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses relate. Yet
enabling P to redistribute this risk reduces public welfare through limiting
competition-that is, the competition that would result once the unwarranted
patent is deemed invalid. Furthermore, the analysis performed above on
innovation incentives applies here as well. Limiting this type of risk sharing
will not harm incentives for efficient technology transfer, as it does not make P
any worse off.
5. Timing of Challenge
The model also does not consider L's incentives to investigate the validity
of the patent before signing a licensing agreement; in the model, new
information regarding the strength of the patent appears only after the contract
is signed. The timing of the challenge is also not an issue, since it only occurs
at the end of the first period. However, in practice timing may be an important
issue. The earlier the information arrives, the earlier the challenge.
Consequently, the resulting gain to social welfare will be larger.
As Dreyfuss and Pope emphasize, a rule that enables L to challenge the
patent at a later date reduces L's incentives to invest in checking the validity of
the patent before entering into the licensing contract.128 This, in turn, lengthens
the period that the public must pay supra-competitive prices for invalid patents.
Of course, if L could have obtained the relevant information only after signing
the contract, the timing of the challenge does not contribute to the social
welfare loss caused by the invalid patent.
But timing only arises as a relevant concern if the information could have
been obtained in the pre-contract period. And the need to pay royalties already
provides a motivation for such a scrutiny, unless the contract is an
anticompetitive venture between P and L to split the benefits of a weak patent.
Furthermore, because invalidation would precipitate a move to a competitive
market, it is possible that no potential L would be motivated to invest in such a
challenge at the pre-contractual stage. Rather, it would be in L's interest to
challenge the patent once he establishes some degree of first-mover advantage.
Though the market might not immediately move to a competitive structure,
127. Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 47, at 988.
128. Id. at 988, 990.
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costs to the public might nonetheless be reduced if L plans to bring a challenge
soon after signing the contract and establishing first-mover advantage.
Finally, courts already strengthen L's incentives to challenge as early as
possible by barring recovery for payments that L made for the right to use the
patent before bringing a challenge.129 If these royalties cannot be recovered,'"
L would also have a stronger incentive to verify the validity of the patent before
entering into the licensing agreement. If L were able to recover all past
royalties, he would wait for the end of the patent term to challenge, which
would enable him to both enjoy the patent's exclusivity and recover all
royalties already paid. The anticompetitive effects of this arrangement would
harm social welfare.
6. Differentiating Between Different Types of Clauses
We have grouped termination-upon-challenge and other penalty clauses
together in our analysis. There might be reasons, however, to differentiate
between them, and in particular to give special scrutiny to termination-upon-
challenge clauses. Most courts have enforced these types of challenge-penalty
clauses. Since a challenge may negatively affect the ongoing contractual
relationship between the parties, it would reduce the private and social benefits
that arise from the contract, such as the efficient production of patent-based
products. Thus, courts have considered termination to be warranted.
We argue, however, that courts should not automatically allow P to
terminate the contract. If termination results in large costs to L-including
potential infringement penalties if L continues production-P should need to
prove that the harm to the contractual relationship would necessarily translate
into a significantly large harm to society. Otherwise, social welfare will
decrease because L will have to cease production or risk infringement suits. For
example, consider the case of a simple licensing agreement that involves the
use of the patent for pre-specified royalties. Here, there is no complex ongoing
relationship, and thus no justification for differentiating termination clauses
from other contractual challenge penalties.
7. Ensuring that Social Welfare Is Increased
The final question concerns the overall effect of these various
considerations on social welfare. Patents do not necessarily create significant
market power. Even the small percentage of patents that are licensed does not
generally change market conditions significantly. The model cannot clearly
differentiate, at the contract negotiation stage, between patents that will create
129. After MedImmune there was a debate over royalties paid in the litigation period.
E.g., Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 47, at 983.
130. In Lear the Court decided that L does not need to pay royalties during the




market power and those that will not. If it could, there would be no need to
interfere in the parties' private conduct that does not affect the market.
However, the value of many patents is not known before they are put to the
market test; thus, such differentiation is not feasible.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the risk of challenge is only high
if the patent creates market power. Otherwise, the high costs of patent litigation
will generally not be worth L's effort. Therefore, the no-contest and challenge-
penalty clauses will in practice affect only the probability of a challenge against
a patent that creates market power. And any degree of market power that L can
constrain by challenging an invalid patent can increase social welfare.
Thus, having in this Section contended with many considerations raised
by courts and the literature, we conclude that restrictions on no-contest and
challenge clauses yield important public benefits with limited offsetting effects.
Finally, we should note that, to ensure that the public indeed enjoys the patent's
invalidity, no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses should only be found
unenforceable where the challenge will result in the patent's invalidity as
against the world.m' Otherwise, the parties might prefer to challenge the patent
in arbitration proceedings in which the private benefit does not translate into a
public one.
Conclusion
This Article has analyzed the social-welfare ffects of different legal
regimes governing the validity of no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses,
contractual limitations that diminish a licensee's incentives and the ability to
challenge the patent underlying his licensing agreement.
Challenges to unwarranted patents erve an important social function and
are generally beneficial to society. They rid the economy of unwarranted
patents and foster competition, to consumers' benefit. Patent licensees play a
vital role in bringing these challenges, as we cannot always rely on the PTO or
third parties to perform this role efficiently.
Yet the analysis has shown that such challenges do not always benefit
society. Challenges might prove harmful in a subset of cases where the patent is
strong enough that the potential social benefits from the challenge are lower
than the expected litigation costs. Accordingly, we need legal rules to align
private incentives for challenging patents with social welfare. The choice of
optimal rules for governing no-contest and challenge-penalty clauses depends
on how each rule balances the contracting parties' conduct against social
welfare.
131. Third parties can infringe, take the risk that the patent holder will sue, and
attempt to raise invalidity as a defense. Yet these actions involve costs to these third parties, such as the
litigation and reputation costs of being sued for patent infringement.
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This Article has sought to discover the optimal legal rule by answering
two basic questions. First, should courts enforce no-contest clauses, which
prevent a licensee from challenging the validity of the underlying patent?
Second, should courts permit some form of a challenge penalty? While the first
question has been the subject of some doctrinal and scholarly attention, the
second question has largely been unexplored in the literature.
Our answer to the first of these questions is unambiguously no. This
conclusion stands in contrast to the position of the Federal Circuit. Our analysis
suggests that no-contest clauses do not serve social welfare. At their worst, no-
contest clauses may provide a method for parties to cartelize the market based
on a patent that was wrongly granted. Though the court and scholars have been
predominantly concerned with contractual stability, we argue that a forward-
looking policy focused on social welfare will take these considerations largely
off the table. While it conflicts with the Federal Circuit, our analysis is aligned
with the "spirit of Lear,"1 32 which many courts have adopted. We have more
accurately specified the conditions under which this spirit flourishes.
Regarding the second question, we first emphasize the connection
between the two answers. A policy that prohibits no-contest clauses should also
place some limits on challenge-penalty clauses. If the parties have complete
contractual flexibility over the level of challenge penalties, these clauses would
become equivalent to no-contest clauses and would thus harm social welfare.
Furthermore, determining the enforceability of challenge-penalty clauses
requires carefully comparing the benefits that he licensee would receive from
invalidation to the benefits that would accrue to society, as we showed above.
While such clauses often limit social welfare, in certain cases, allowing
penalties may increase social welfare. For this reason, it is important that
challenge penalties be subject to severe limitations, such as maximum caps.
With regard to both types of clauses we would allow challenges only in
proceedings in which the invalidation applies as against the world, rather than
against the specific litigants. This limitation will ensure that society will in fact
realize the welfare benefits that result from restricting no-contest and
challenge-penalty clauses.
Our work cannot be concluded without emphasizing that the legal rules
explored in this Article are only a second-best solution to the problem of
unwarranted patents. A preferred solution may be to ensure that the PTO
performs its task rigorously, especially with regard to patents that might have
significant market effects. But until this happens, licensees will continue to
play an important role in ridding the economy of invalid patents, thereby
increasing beneficial competition. This solution is part of the trend of self-
132. See Thomas J. McCarthy, "Unmuzzling" the Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake




help-the goal of the law is to ensure that licensees internalize the social
benefits and the costs of challenging patents.
Appendix
Let q(p) be the annual demand for the product based on the patent; let p(q)
be the inverse function. The probability that a court will uphold the patent if
challenged is given by s, and is drawn from a cumulative distribution function
F with support over [0,1], and with probability density function f There is a
large set N= {1, . . . , n} of ex-ante identical firms that can produce the product
by making a one-time fixed investment A and then paying a production cost of
c(q). The function A + c(q) is strictly sub-additive.
At t(0), the patent is granted to the patent holder (P) by the PTO. The
patent has a life of two periods.
At t(1), P chooses a firm from the set N and enters into contractual
negotiations with regard to the use by the firm of the patent. Without loss of
generality, we will assume this to be firm 1; for clarity we will refer to the firm
as L (for licensee). The contract contains four parts: (1) whether there is a no-
contest clause, (2) whether there is a challenge penalties clause, (3) the size of
the challenge penalty d, and (4) the level of royalties r, which is assumed to be
a fraction of L's profits.
At t(2), L decides the level of the good, qii to produce during the first
period.
At t(3), at the end of the first period, L and P learn the patent strength s,
which is drawn from the distribution F.
At t(4), L chooses whether to challenge the patent. L may only challenge
the patent if allowed to do so by the contract, and if so must pay a litigation
cost z as well as the penalty d to P if the contract contains a challenge penalty
clause. At t(5), P decides whether to defend the patent, and if so pays an
identical litigation cost z.133
At t(6), the decision-maker (be it a court or the PTO) decides whether the
patent is valid or not, and chooses to uphold it with probability s. For
simplicity, we assume that the decision is the correct one. If the patent is found
to be invalid, it then returns to the public domain. We also assume that the
contract is invalidated, so that no future royalties are owed.134 If the patent is
found to be valid, the original contract remains in force.
At t(7), L chooses a quantity to produce during the second period, which
will be denoted ql2. If the patent has been invalidated, other firms in the market
may also produce and choose their production levels at this time. We will
denote by qi2 the amount produced by firm i in the second period.
133. L might incur additional challenge costs. In this model we disregard them.
134. Note that this might require an additional legal step.
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At t(8), the parties receive their payouts.
If the patent is not invalidated, L receives the first period profits minus the
royalties (1 - r)(qiip(qui) -A - c(qii)) plus the second period profits minus the
royalties (1 - r)(ql2p(q12) - c(q12)), minus the cost of challenging the patent z
(if challenged) and the challenge penalty d (if the patent is challenged and such
a penalty is applied). P receives the royalties r (qI p(q i) + ql2 p(q 12) - A -
c(qi1) - c(q12)) minus the cost of defending the patent z (if challenged and
defended) plus the challenge penalty d (if the patent is challenged by L and the
penalty is applied).
If the patent is invalidated, L receives the first period profits minus the
royalties (1 - r)(qll p(qiu) - A - c(qii)), plus the second period profits
(qi2p(j=9qi2) - c(ql2)), minus the cost of challenging the patent z (if
challenged) and the challenge penalty d (if the patent is challenged and such a
penalty is applied). P receives the royalties r (qiu p(qii) - A - c(qi1)) minus the
cost of defending the patent z (if defended) plus the challenge penalty d (if the
patent is challenged by L and the penalty is applied). Other firms receive their
second period profits (qi2P(=1 qi2) - c(qi2)).
Under Partial Restriction, no-challenge clauses are prohibited but
challenge penalties are permitted. Thus P will defend a lawsuit if z <
sr (ql2 p(q12) - c(q12)) (1). We can rewrite this inequality as s >
z / (r (ql2p(q12) - c(q12))), that is, if the chance that the patent will be upheld is
greater than the cost of defending the lawsuit divided by the expected revenues
if successful. Because d is not an element in this inequality, it follows that P's
incentives to defend the challenge are the same under both Partial Restriction
and Total Restriction.
If condition (1) is not met, L will challenge as long as the cost of the suit z
plus the penalty d is less than the expected benefit to the licensee of winning
(q12 =0 1qi2) - c(q12) - (1 - r)(qmp(qm) - c(qm))). If condition (1) is
met, the licensee will challenge if s(-z - d) + (1 - s)(q12P( =1 qi2)-
c(ql2) - (1 - r)(qmp(qm) - c(qm)) - z - d) > 0 (2). This inequality can be
rewritten as s < 1- (z + d)/(ql2 P =j1 qi2) - c(q12) - (1 - r)(qp(qm m
c(qm))). Under Total Restriction, L will challenge as ifd= 0, that is, if:
z
S < =1q12 p( I q ) - c(ql2) - (1 - r)(qmp(qm) - c(qm))
A challenge reduces total profits because there is an expenditure on the
litigation 2z, and in there is a weak decrease in profits in the event of a suit
(q12 Pr =1 qi2) - c(q12) qmp(q.) - c(qm)). However, if =j qi2 qm, then
there is not necessarily a loss in social welfare, because there is a decrease in
the deadweight loss of
f p(q) - c'(q)dq




A challenge is socially optimal if it is brought whenever:
2z < (1 - s) fxm p(q) - c'(q)dq
or alternatively, whenever:
2z
fIF= " p(q) - c'(q)dq
Thus the Partial Restriction rule is optimal if:
(2(q12P(=1 qi2) - c(q12) - (1-r)(qmp(qm) - c(qm)))
d = (n 1)fZL=1 p(q) - c'(q)dq
It is readily verified that d is positive if and only if:
q12P (=1qi2) - c(q12) - (1- r)(qmp (qm) - c(q.)) > ' ap(q)
c'(q)dq.
Otherwise Total Restriction clearly dominates the other two rules.
If condition (2) is not met, there will not be a challenge, and the payoffs to
the patent holder are r (2q. p(q.) - A - 2c(q.)), and the payoffs to the licensee
are (1 - r)(2qm p(q.) - A - 2c(qm)). Total profits will equal the monopoly profit,
2q. p(qm) - A - 2c(q.). If condition (2) is met, then there will be a challenge,
and the patent holder will receive r ((1 + s) qm p(q.) - A - (1 + s) c(qm)) - z + d,
while the licensee will receive (1 - r)((1 + s)qmp(qm) - A - (1 + s)c(q.)) -
z - d + (1 - s)(ql2P(9'=1qi2) - c(q12)). Total profits will equal ((1 +
s)qmp(qm) - A - (1 + s)c(qm)) + (1 - s)(q12p( 7 z qi2) - c(ql2)) - 2z.
Because all of the potential licensees are ex ante identical, they cannot profit.
Therefore, in both cases, the royalty is set so that the patent holder's payoffs
equal the total profits.
Under Total Restriction, neither no-challenge clauses nor challenge
penalties are permitted. This is equivalent to Partial Restriction in the case that
d is constrained to equal zero. As mentioned above, the patent holder will
defend the suit if s > z / (r (ql2p(q12) - c(q12))), just as under Partial Restriction,
and the licensee will challenge if s < 1 - (z)/(q12P(Z=1 qi2) - c(q12) - 1 -
r)(qmp(qm) - c(qm))). Note that the right hand side is decreasing in d.
The penalty is simply a transfer payment, but it affects social welfare
indirectly by affecting the odds of a suit. If =1 qi2 is substantially higher
than qm, the expected decrease in the deadweight loss from a suit may be large,
and we can expect social welfare to be higher when challenge penalties are not
permitted. If Yf= qi2 qm, on the other hand, there is no decrease in the
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deadweight loss, and it is not obvious whether a gain in social welfare from the
invalidation of an invalid patent outweighs the social cost of litigation. One
might view a challenge in this case as a wasteful contest between two parties.
It can be problematic if the patent holder does not defend a valid patent;
this can happen ifs > z / (r (q12 p(q12) - c(q12))). For a significant patent, the
expected profits (in the denominator) should be expected to far outweigh the
litigation cost, so this should only happen for very weak patents.
Under No Restriction, both no-challenge clauses and challenge penalties
are permitted. The patent holder can maximize profits by putting in a no-
challenge clause. To the extent that a lawsuit is expected to improve social
welfare, No Restriction would be considered the worst possible rule; if a
lawsuit is simply a wasteful contest between two parties, it would be the best
possible rule.
There is another issue here: the licensee might be viewed as opportunistic.
The licensee seeks to invalidate the patent after having gained a first mover
advantage from the license. However, this reading is incorrect. In this model
the licensee pays the patent holder fully for this benefit.
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